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Wealth in the U.S. is highly concentrated and skewed to the right. According to the
1992 Survey of Consumer Finance, the wealthiest 1% of the population owns over 30%
of the nation’s wealth while the bottom 50% owns less than 5%. What are the main
causes of, and potential welfare costs associated with, this large wealth inequality?
A recent stream of papers have studied diﬀe r e n tp o s s i b l eq u a n t i t a t i v ee x p l a n a t i o n s
of inequality with diﬀerent degrees of success (papers include Aiyagari 1994; Huggett
1996; Quadrini 1997; Krusell and Smith 1998; Castañeda, Días-Giménez and Ríos-
Rull 2003; De Nardi 2003; and Domeij and Heathcote 2004). Those studies regard
inequality as the result of primarily two market frictions: market incompleteness and
debt constraints. The ﬁrst constraint states that there are not enough securities to
insure against all events, and usually only a riskless bond is assumed; the second
constraint states that individuals are unable to borrow as much as they want, usually
nothing at all. As a result of these two assumed frictions, income ﬂuctuations translate
into wealth and consumption ﬂuctuations and, moreover, into non-degenerated and
stationary distributions of wealth and consumption.
This paper, like the papers above, takes the view that inequality is mainly the
result of debt limits and market incompleteness. It asks what is the quantitative
contribution of each friction alone in explaining the inequality of consumption and
wealth in the U.S. We think this is an important question for at least two reasons.
First, each market friction is likely to be the result of diﬀerent underlying constraints.
Debt limits likely arise from commitment and enforcement problems while incomplete
markets probably arise from asymmetric information and moral hazard problems. If
so, our quantitative exercise should shed light on the underlying main determinants
of inequality and, consequently, provide direction for researchers and policymakers.
Second, a recent stream of literature has argued that market incompleteness may
1not be crucial to explaining important regularities of the data, including wealth and
consumption inequality. This literature instead stresses the role of debt constraints
alone as the main deviation from the Arrow-Debreu framework (Alvarez and Jerman
2000, Kehoe and Levine 2001; Kehoe and Zame 2002, Kehoe and Perri 2002; Krueger
and Perri 2002, Lustig 2003, Lorenzoni 2003). Speciﬁcally on the issue of inequality,
Krueger and Perri (2002) argue that debt-constrained models2 can better explain the
rising inequality in the U.S. during the last 30 years. We explicitly evaluate the role of
debt constraints in macroeconomics by assessing how much wealth and consumption
inequality they alone can explain.
Our decomposition exercise is as follows. We take as our benchmark model of
inequality Aiyagari (1994). He provides a general equilibrium framework to study
consumption and wealth inequality based on three elements: income ﬂuctuations, in-
complete markets, and debt constraints. Speciﬁcally, agents face idiosyncratic earn-
ings shocks but can only save in a riskless asset, capital, and borrowing is prohibited.
Moreover, agents are altruistic, ex-ante identical, and the economy is a production
economy with capital. We calibrate our benchmark model following closely Aiyagari
(1994) and Heaton and Lucas (1996).
In order to assess the sole role of the debt constraint, we modify the baseline model
by allowing agents to trade a complete array of Arrow securities, in the spirit of the
debt constrained literature. Our modiﬁed model has thus only one friction, the debt
constraint. This constraint prohibits agents from borrowing in any state of the world.
In particular, agents can sell Arrow securities but only up to an amount that is fully
secured by the value of their capital so that their net asset position in any state of
the world is never negative. Thus, our non-borrowing constraint can be interpreted
as a secure debt constraint or collateral constraint as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Córdoba and Ripoll (2004), or Lustig (2001). By comparing the predictions of the
2Following Kehoe and Levine (2001), we call these models debt-constrained models.
2models with and without Arrow securities, we can assess the independent role of
market incompleteness and the debt constraint in creating inequality.
We ﬁnd that the main cause of inequality is the lack of insurance markets (market
incompleteness) rather than the debt constraint. Surprisingly, all inequality and
ineﬃciencies of the benchmark economy disappear when markets are completed even
when net borrowing is prohibited. This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast with the debt-
constrained literature and, in particular, with the results of Krueger and Perri (2002)
who study the U.S. consumption inequality using a related complete-markets debt-
constrained model. In principle, inequality in our complete markets model should
be larger than in theirs because our debt limits are seemingly more stringent. They
allow for unsecured debt but we do not.
The explanation for our strong result lies in the role of capital stock in the econ-
omy. Debt-constrained models typically assume a pure exchange economy3.I ns u c h
economies, our stringent assumption precluding borrowing in any state of nature
would result in autarky. Instead, in our production economy with complete markets,
capital can make full risk sharing possible. This is because capital serves three pur-
poses. First, it is an input in production. Second, it creates the need and means
for aggregate savings. The average individual in a production economy has positive
savings and can use them for self-insurance. This reduces the role of borrowing limits
relative to a pure exchange economy in which the typical agent has zero savings.
Third, capital enables security markets to work. Agents with positive capital, a
non-contingent asset, can use it as collateral for their contingent debts. Moreover, if
the modiﬁed golden rule level of capital is suﬃciently large relative to the economy’s
income risk, a representative agent could perfectly collateralize all his/her needs for
contingent debts and obtain full insurance (See Proposition 7). If so, perfect equality
3Lustig (2001, 2003) and Lorenzoni (2003) have a debt constraints similar to ours. As they also
assume complete markets, our main results apply to their papers.
3becomes a stationary equilibrium.
We ﬁnd that, for the benchmark calibration, the modiﬁed golden rule level of
capital is suﬃcient to secure all contingent debts that a representative agent would
require to perfectly smooth consumption. The amount of income risk in the U.S.
is just not large enough to exhaust all the collateral in any state of nature. It is
important to stress that our baseline calibration of the income process is based on the
results of Heaton and Lucas (1996) who use direct evidence on household earnings
dynamics from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
In order to check the robustness of our results, we perform sensitivity analysis using
two radically diﬀerent calibrations of the income process. One follows Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron (2003), and the other, Castañeda, Días-Giménez and Ríos-Rull
(2003). These authors use indirect evidence and a variety of assumptions to argue
that the amount of income risk is much larger than previously thought. In particular,
shocks should be much larger and persistent than our baseline.
When we use these alternative calibrations, we ﬁnd that debt constraints do play
a role. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that a substantial degree of inequality remains even after
completing the markets. For example, the Gini coeﬃcients of wealth and consumption
only slightly decrease when markets are completed. However, the standard deviation
of wealth decreases dramatically, between 40% and 70%. The remaining wealth dis-
persion is far too small to explain the U.S. evidence. The coeﬃcient of variation of
wealth is above 6 in the data but below 1.5 in the complete market model. This
strongly suggests that debt-constraints alone cannot account for the observed disper-
sion of wealth for a realistic earning process. Moreover, using a standard equalitarian
m e a s u r eo fs o c i a lw e l f a r e ,w eﬁnd that between 55% and 72% of the social welfare
costs of inequality could be eliminated by just completing the markets.
Overall, we conclude that market incompleteness is the main friction behind in-
4equality. Debt constraints could play a potentially important, but still limited, role.
This conclusion is strengthened by another ﬁnding about debt-constrained models.
They can barely explain the large concentration of wealth in the top tail of the distri-
bution. When markets are complete, rich agents can perfectly smooth consumption.
A feature of these models, as stressed by Kehoe and Levine (2001), is that the interest
rate is below the rate of time preference. As a result, rich agents will have decreasing
proﬁles of consumption and wealth, which prevents these models from producing a
long right tail of the wealth distribution. Empirically, this tail is critical as a large
fraction of wealth is concentrated there.
Finally, we want to highlight the analytical contributions of the paper. We de-
rive equilibrium properties of the complete-markets debt-constrained economy when
debt constraints are exogenous, as in Aiyagari (1994). Most of the existent work
on this topic refers to pure exchange economies with participation constraints un-
der the threat of exclusion (particularly, Kehoe and Levine 2001, Krueger and Perri
2002). Instead, our focus is on production economies with simpler non-borrowing
constraints. We think this is an important workhorse model to study issues related to
debt constraints and incomplete markets. We use simple methods to show that if the
capital intensity of the economy is not suﬃciently large relative to the income risk,
the equilibrium interest rate is below the rate of time preference, and the capital stock
exceeds the modiﬁed golden rule level. We devise a simple algorithm to compute the
equilibrium, and in particular, to solve the portfolio decision problem with multiple
assets. This is an important contribution of the paper because similar problems with
multiple assets have been regarded as "computationally too burdensome (Kluber and
Schmedders, 2001, footnote 3)."
The remaining part of the paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 describes the
model and equilibrium properties of the complete-markets debt-constrained model;
5Section 3 describes the baseline calibration and Section 4 reports the results under this
calibration; Section 5 performs robustness checks using alternative characterizations
of the earning process; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model economy
We now describe a parsimonious model that can be used to study two diﬀerent
economies: one without insurance markets and one with insurance markets. The
ﬁrst economy is identical to the one studied by Aiyagari (1994). The second economy
adds insurance markets into the ﬁrst economy via competitive markets for Arrow
securities. Formally, this economy is a complete-markets debt-constrained economy.
We call it complete markets or debt constrained economy for short. Both economies
are populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households of mass one and time is
discrete.
2.1 Employment opportunities
We assume that every household has a random endowment, et,o fe ﬃciency labor units.
Labor endowments are independently and identically distributed across households.
They follow a ﬁnite state Markov chain with conditional transition probabilities given
by π(e0|e)=P r ( et+1 = e0|et = e), where e and e0 ∈ E = {e1,e 2,...,e n}, and 0 <
e1 <. . .<e n. There is a unique stationary distribution of endowments, P,w i t h
unconditional expected value of 1.A sar e s u l t ,e1 < 1 and en > 1.
2.2 Preferences
Households’s preferences over consumption streams are described by a standard ex-








where Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on information available up
to time t, ct is consumption, and function u is identical across agents and satisﬁes
u0 > 0, u00 < 0.
2.3 Production possibilities
There is a freely available constant returns to scale production technology that trans-
forms eﬃciency units of labor, L, and capital, K, into output according to the function
F(L,K). Aggregate capital is obtained by aggregating the capital holdings of every
household, and the aggregate labor input is obtained by aggregating the eﬃciency la-
bor units supplied by every household. Capital depreciates geometrically at a constant
rate δ. Deﬁne gross output as f(k) ≡ F(k,1) + (1 − δ)k. We assume that function f
satisﬁes f(0) = 0,f 0 > 0, f00 < 0.
2.4 Market arrangements
We consider two sequential market arrangements: one without insurance markets and
one with insurance markets or complete markets. In both arrangements, households
can accumulate wealth in the form of real capital, bt, a riskless asset. This is the
only asset available in the ﬁrst market arrangement. In the second arrangement,
households can also buy or sell a full array of Arrow securities, at(ei). These securities
entitle the owner to receive at(ei) units of consumption goods at t+1only if his/her
labor endowment at t+1is ei. A negative at(ei) means that the owner is required to
deliver goods rather than to receive.
We further assume that households cannot borrow. This assumption implies that
in the ﬁrst arrangement households cannot hold a negative amount of capital. For
7the second market arrangement, it implies a secure debt constraint. In particular,
sales of Arrow securities, a form of borrowing, are allowed but those promises must
be secured by the value of the physical capital so that net borrowing is prevented in
every possible state.
Finally, we assume that markets are competitive. Firms rent factors of production
from households in competitive spot markets, and insurance contracts are traded in
competitive spot markets. These assumptions imply that factor prices are given by
the corresponding marginal productivities and that insurance prices are actuarially
fair.
2.5 Recursive competitive equilibrium
We now describe a recursive formulation of the household’s problem and deﬁne the
equilibrium concept in recursive terms. Denote rt the rental price of capital, wt the
wage rate, and qt(ej,e i) the price of an Arrow security that pays one unit of good in
state ej at time t +1i ft h ec u r r e n ts t a t ei sei,w h e r eej,e i ∈ E.
2.5.1 Household’s problem
At the beginning of period t households observe the realization of their labor en-
dowment, et. The endowment determines the household’s resources for that period
which includes wage earnings, wtet, capital holdings including the returns on capi-
tal, (1 + rt)bt−1, and insurance claims or liabilities, at−1(et). Let xt denote the total
resources available at time t deﬁned as
xt = wteit +( 1+rt)bt−1 + at−1(et).
A household’s resources lie in the state space X ∈ [0,∞]. We can now describe
the household’s individual state at time t by the couple (xt,e t). For the recursive
formulation, we drop time subscripts for the current-period variables, and use primes
8to denote the values of the variables one period ahead. In addition, we use the
parameter Γ to switch between the economy with insurance markets (Γ =1 )a n dt h e
one without insurance markets (Γ =0 ).
The following is the dynamic program solved by a household whose state is (x,e):


















Γa(ei)+( 1+r0)b ≥ 0 for ei ∈ E,
where v denotes the household’s value function. The ﬁrst restriction on the prob-
lem is the budget constraint that allows accumulation of capital, b, and contingent
claims, a(ei),i fΓ =1 . The second constraint of the problem is the borrowing con-
straint. It states that the net wealth, deﬁned as a(ei)+( 1+r0)b, cannot be negative
in any state.
The solution to this problem is a set of functions that map states into choices
for consumption, capital accumulation, and insurance claims or promises. We denote
this set by {c(x,e),b(x,e),a(e1;x,e),...,a(en;x,e)}.
2.5.2 Equilibrium concept
Each period the economy-wide state is a measure of households, Jt, deﬁned over B, an
appropriate family of subsets of {X ×E}. For the purposes of this paper we focus on
a stationary situation in which Jt is constant over time. By the law of large numbers,
the aggregate labor supply is equal to 1.
Deﬁnition: A stationary equilibrium of this economy is a value function, V (x,e);
policy functions {c(x,e),b(x,e),a(e1;x,e),...,a(en;x,e)}; a probability measure of
9households, J; factor prices (r,w); security prices q(ej,e i) for i,j =1 ,2,..,n;a n d
aggregate K such that:
1. c(x,e), b(x,e) and {a(ei;x,e)}
n
i=1 are optimal decision rules given prices, and
V (x,e) solves the functional equation.
2. Factor prices are factor marginal productivities:
r = F1(K,1) − δ and w = F2(K,1)















for all B ∈ B; I is an indicator function.
2.6 Characterization of the equilibrium
We now provide an analytical characterization of the equilibrium for the cases Γ =0
and Γ =1 . We discuss brieﬂyt h ec a s eΓ =0since it has been well studied in
the literature. We instead focus on the case Γ =1 . A useful reference point for
the analysis is the frictionless case. In that case, the aggregate capital stock, k∗,i s
determined by the modiﬁed golden rule, and the interest rate, r∗, is equal to the rate
of time preference, ρ ≡ 1/β − 1:
1=βf0(K∗,1) and r∗ = ρ
102.7 Incomplete markets case (Γ =0 )
The case Γ =0is by now well understood and fairly standard. Details about the
stationary equilibrium for this economy can be found in Aiyagari (1994) and Hugget
(1997). The following are some important properties of this equilibrium. First, some
restrictions on preferences or endowments are required to guarantee the existence of
a stationary equilibrium. In particular, a stationary equilibrium may not exist if the
coeﬃcient of risk aversion is unbounded. Second, the equilibrium displays capital
over-accumulation relative to the complete markets economy, and an interest rate
below the rate of time preference. Finally, the ergodic set for x is [we1,x max], where
xmax >w e n.
To put some of these results in perspective, we show in the next section that when
markets are complete, (i) the ﬁrst restriction is not required; (ii) there is still capital
over accumulation and the interest rate is below the rate of time preference provided
that an additional restriction is satisﬁed; (iii) the ergodic set shrinks to [we1,we n].
This last property means that, at least from the point of view of the range of the
stationary distribution, inequality decreases when insurance markets are introduced.
The following proposition collects the results for the case Γ =0 .D e n o t eb yKa
and ra the equilibrium capital stock and interest rate of this economy.
Assumption 1: cu(c)00/u0(c) is bounded above for all c suﬃciently large.
Assumption 2:e i t h e ru0(0) > 0, or we1 > 0.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the economy with no insurance (Γ =0 )
(i) posseses a stationary equilibrium; (ii) the ergodic set for x is [we1,x max], where
xmax >w e n; and (iii) Ka >K ∗ and ra <ρ .
112.8 Complete markets case (Γ =1 )
This section now characterizes some relevant properties of the equilibria with complete
markets. To the extent of our knowledge, most of the results of this section are new in
the literature. It is convenient to divide the task into two sections. First, we describe
the solution to the household’s problem given that the interest rate is below the rate
of time preference (r<ρ ), and insurance prices are actuarially fair. This partial
equilibrium problem is an extension of the income ﬂuctuation problem, analyzed,
among others, by Schechtman and Escudero (1977).
Second, we study the determination of the interest rate. We provide a necessary
and suﬃcient condition so that in fact r<ρin equilibrium. If such condition holds,
we show that the stationary equilibrium exists without further restrictions on the
degree of risk aversion.
2.8.1 The income ﬂuctuation problem with complete markets
For analytical convenience, consider the case in which endowments are i.i.d, i.e.,
π(e0,e i)=π(e0) for all ei ∈ E. We drop this assumption for the quantitative work.
As a result of this assumption, the only relevant individual state variable is now x,
since e has no informational content.
Let Γ =1in the household’s problem, suppose r<ρ ,a n dq(ei)=π(ei)/(1 + r).
Deﬁne xi ≡ wei + a(ei)+( 1+r)b. We can then rewrite the household problem as:























i ≥ xi for i =1 ,..,n,
where xi ≡ wei. The last constraints are the state contingent borrowing constraints.
We ﬁnd convenient, for analytical clarity as well as for computational purposes, to
12rewrite this problem into two simpler subproblems, a deterministic-dynamic problem
and a stochastic-static problem. The ﬁrst subproblem describes the optimal saving-
consumption decision, which only requires ﬁnding the total amount of savings. The
second subproblem describes the optimal allocation of those savings across diﬀerent
states (or assets).
Subproblem 1 (Dynamic and deterministic):
V (x)=m a x
c≥0,y
{u(c)+βW (y)} (2)





















i ≥ xi for i =1 ,..,n
Consider ﬁrst the solution to subproblem (3). Standard arguments show that the
ﬁrst order necessary and envelope conditions of this problem are:
V 0(x0∗
i ) ≥ λ, with equality if x0∗
i >w e i,
V 0(x0∗
i )=u0(c0),
where λ is the multiplier on the resource constraint. Note that absent the borrowing
constraints, it will be optimal to smooth resources, and consumptions, completely
across states, i.e., x0∗
i = y.
Figure 1 illustrates the solution of the constrained problem when n =4 .I fs a v i n g s
is at its lowest possible level, y = y1 ≡ ω, then the only possible allocation is x0∗
i = xi,
13i.e., no insurance is purchased at all. As savings increase above its minimum level,
it is optimal to allocate all additional savings to the poorest state, the one with the
highest marginal utility of resources, while keeping the resources for other states at
their minimum. This is accomplished by purchasing insurance only for the worst
possible state (a(e1) > 0).
T h e r ei sal e v e lo fs a v i n g s ,y2, that allows agents to purchase enough insurance so
that the marginal utility of the worst possible state equates to the one of the second
worst possible state. Such a level of savings is given by y2 = x2π(e1)+
Pn
i=2 eiπ(ei).
As savings increase above y2, it is optimal to insure the two worst states so that their
marginal utilities are equal. This is accomplish by choosing x0∗
1 = x0∗
2 ,a n dx0∗
i = xi
for i>2. One can proceed in this fashion to ﬁnd the solution for successively higher








xjπ(ej) for i =1 ,..,n− 1
yn ≡ xn
Then, (i) for yi ≤ y ≤ yi+1
x0∗






for all j ≤ i
x0∗
j = xj(y) ≡ xj for i<j≤ n
and (ii) for y>y n,x 0∗
j = y for all j.
This closed form solution is very convenient for analytical and computational
purposes since, at least for i.i.d endowments, the savings problem with many assets is
not more complicated as the one with a single asset4. The following corollary of the
previous proposition is used below.
4Thus, there is no additional computational burden as suspected by Kubler and Schmedders
(2001).
14Corollary 3 xt+1 ≥ xn requires y ≥ yn.
Consider now the solution to the ﬁrst problem (2). A household’s optimal total
savings, y, is characterized by the Euler equation:
(4) u0(c) ≥ β(1 + r)Eu0(c0)
Denote y = g(x) the solution for this problem. It is standard to show that g is
an increasing function of x. The following proposition states that the maximum
sustainable level of resources is xn.
Proposition 4 Suppose r<ρ .T h e n , ( i ) i f xt ≥ xn,t h e nxt+1 <x t; and (ii) if
xt ≤ xn then xt+1 ≤ xn.
Proof. (i) Suppose, by contradiction, that xt+1 ≥ xt ≥ xn. By the previous
Corollary (3), yt = g(xt) ≥ yn = xn. Proposition (2) then implies that x0∗
jt+1 = yt for
all j.T h u s ,xt+1 = yt.Therefore, ct+1, as o l ef u n c t i o no fxt+1, is equal in all possible
states. For unconstrained agents, condition (4) then reads u0(ct)=β(1 + r)u0(ct+1).
Since r<ρ ,then ct+1 <c t, which requires xt+1 <x t. A contradiction. (ii) Suppose
by contradiction that xt+1 >x n ≥ xt. A similar argument to part (i) implies that
xt+1 <x t, a contradiction.
The following Proposition states x1 is the minimum sustainable level of resources.
Proposition 5 Suppose r<ρ .T h e n ,g(x1)=y1 and x0
1 = x1 with probability π1.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction that g(x1) >y 1, which implies x0
1 >x 1. From
f.o.c. with respect to x0
1, u(c(x1)) = β(1 + r)u(c(x0
1)), with equality because x0
1 >x 1.
Then u(c(x1)) <u (c(x0
1)), or c(x1) >c (x0
1),o rx1 >x 0
1, a contradiction.
Figure 2 provides a graphical description of the last three propositions and some
implications. For an initial suﬃciently large level of resources (above e x> x n, in the
15graph), agents fully smooth resources for next period, so that x0 is a deterministic
function of x,a n dx0 <x .Below e x, agents do not fully insure. In particular, they
only insure against the worst possible states. Thus with some positive probability,
x0 = xn for all x<e x. However, x0 >x 1 a.s. if some insurance is purchased. If x falls
below a certain level b x, agents purchase no insurance at all and x0 = x1 with some
positive probability. Thus, we have established that the ergodic set for x is [x1,x n].
2.8.2 General Equilibrium
We now show that r<ρin a stationary equilibrium provided that a necessary and
suﬃcient condition is met. We drop the assumption that endowments are i.i.d in this
Section. The following results are well known.
Proposition 6 If borrowing constraints are not binding for any positive mass of
agents in equilibrium, then the stationary level of capital is determined by the modiﬁed
golden rule, individual consumptions are constant over time, and the distribution J
is not unique. In particular, a perfectly equalitarian distribution of consumptions and
riskless assets is an equilibrium.
Consider the amount that a representative agent, and agent with average level
of consumption and average holdings of riskless asset, would need to purchase (or
sell) of contingent assets to sustain a constant consumption proﬁle. Below we show
that under perfect risk sharing a(e) for such agent is given by −w · θ(e),w h e r e 5
θ(e)=
P∞
s=0 βs (E0[es − 1|e]). Notice that θ(e) is the expected present value of labor
endowment above the average endowment. If θ(e) > 0 then a representative agent






where 1 is a column vector of ones, Π is the transition matrix, and e is a vector of possible values for
the endowments.
16would like to make a(e) negative to compensate for the relatively good stream of
labor income expected in state e. In exchange, the representative agent would like to
make a(e) positive for those states with a low expect stream of labor income. Thus,
borrowing will occur against states with relatively high θ. Denote θ =m a x e {θ(e)}.
The following Proposition states whether or not such a level of borrowing could be
secured by the capital stock of the economy.







Proof. Suppose perfect risk sharing is a stationary equilibrium. Then, using the
budget constraint, at(et) satisﬁes
at(et)=c + b − wet − (1 + r)b +
X
βa(et+1)π(et+1|et)
where consumption and holdings of riskless assets are constant, and q(e0,e)=βπ(et+1|et)








Without loss of generality, consider a representative agent of this economy who holds




βs (1 − Et [et+s|et]) = −wθ(et)
Since perfect risk sharing is possible, then at(et) > −(1 + r)K∗ = K∗/β for all et,




For suﬃciency, one can go backwards and construct a stationary equilibrium with a
representative agent.
Proposition 7 states that a stationary equilibrium with full insurance exists only
if the modiﬁed golden rule level of the capital-output ratio is suﬃciently large relative
17to a measure of income dispersion, θ. To illustrate this condition, consider two cases.
First, suppose shocks are i.i.d. In that case, θ(e)=e − 1 and perfect risk sharing
becomes a stationary equilibrium if K∗
f(K∗) >βen−1
en . This formula shows that perfect
risk sharing is possible if the best possible endowment is not extremely large relative
to the capital stock. Intuitively, agents would like to borrow against their best possible
endowment. If such endowment is large relative to the average, then capital may not
be enough to secure all the required borrowing.
Second, suppose shocks are persistent. In particular, suppose Et[et − 1|e]=
τt (e − 1) so that τ ∈ [0,1] captures the degree of persistence6.I n t h a t c a s e θ(e)=
e−1
1−βτ and perfect risk sharing is obtained if K∗
f(K∗) >βen−1
en−βτ. This expression shows
that perfect risk sharing could occur if shocks are not extremely persistent.
The following proposition states that two basic properties of incomplete markets
economies still hold for the complete markets economy provided that the condition
of previous proposition does not hold. Speciﬁcally, a stationary equilibrium is char-
acterized by capital over-accumulation and an interest rate below the rate of time
preference. Denote by Kb and rb the equilibrium capital stock and interest rate of
the complete markets economy.
Proposition 8 Suppose K∗
f(K∗) <
βθ
1+θ.T h e nKb >K ∗ and rb <ρ .
Proof. From the ﬁrst order conditions we obtain
u0(c) ≥ β(1 + rb)Eu0(c0)
If β(1 + rb) > 1 then Kb <K ∗ and Mt ≥ EtMt+1, where Mt ≡ βt(1 + rb)tu0(ct).M t
is a non-negative supermartingale and therefore converges. Since β(1 + rb) > 1, then
u0 must converge to zero. Thus, c →∞which violates feasibility since Kb <K ∗.
If β(1 + rb)=1then u0(c) ≥ Eu0(c0). Thus, u0(c) converges. If c converges to a
6This assumption do not ﬁt our assumption of a discrete Markov process, but it helps to develop
some intuition.
18ﬁnite constant, then full insurance is obtained which contradicts Proposition 7. Thus,
c →∞which violates feasibility. Then β(1 + rb) < 1, which requires Kb >K ∗.
3 Baseline calibration
Our baseline calibration closely follows Aiyagari (1994) and Heaton and Lucas (1996).
The model period is assumed to be one year. We assume that households preferences
take an isoelastic form, u(c)=c1−µ
1−µ ,w i t hµ =3 , a value that is within the range (1-3)
that is standard in the literature. The technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas,
F(K,L)=KαL1−α, with α =0 .36 which roughly matches the share of capital income
in the U.S. The rate of depreciation, δ, is set at a standard value of 0.08. The discount
factor, β, is assumed to be 0.96.
For the labor endowments, Aiyagari (1994) follows Heaton and Lucas (1996).
Given the importance of the income process for our results, we describe in some
detail the procedure employed by Heaton and Lucas. They adopt an autoregressive
representation for the logarithm of the labor endowments of the form
(5) log(ei
t)=ei + γ log(ei
t−1)+σ(1 − γ2)1/2 i
t,  t ∼ Normal(0,1),
where i refers to a particular household, σ is the coeﬃcient of variation, γ is the
correlation coeﬃcient and ei captures permanent diﬀerences in relative labor endow-
ments and labor income. The process is then estimated using a longitudinal panel of
data from the PSID that includes 860 families with income data spanning 1969-84.
T h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo fγ across households is 0.53 and the average value of σ(1−γ2)1/2
is 0.25,o rσ =0 .35.
Aiyagari approximates this process using a seven state Markov Process, according
to the procedure described by Deaton (1991) and Tauchen (1988). The approximation
takes the state space of log(et), excluding permanent diﬀerences, to be the ﬁnite set
19{−3σ,−2σ,−σ,0,σ,2σ,3σ} so that the state space for ei
t spans from exp(−3σ) to
exp(3σ). Since endowments are log-normal distributed, this interval should include
around 99.9% of the population. The transition probabilities are then computed by
numerical integration.
4R e s u l t s
It is easy to show that for the baseline parametrization all inequality7 would disappear
if markets were completed. We only need to check if the condition provided by
Proposition 7 is satisﬁed. If it is, we can then construct a stationary equilibrium
in which debt constraints are not binding, and individual consumptions and capital
holdings are constants and equal.
The baseline calibration implies a modiﬁed golden rule level of capital-output
ratio, K∗/Y ∗, equal to 0.79. Remember that Y ∗ here includes undepreciated capital.
The corresponding capital output ratio excluding undepreciated capital from output
is 2.96, which is relatively low compared with standard values used in the literature,
usually above 3.
Table 1 shows the levels of ei, wei, θ(ei) and a(ei) implied by the baseline para-
metrization. Labor endowments range from 0.32 to 2.66, and labor income from 0.39
to 3.14,ar a t i oo fm o r et h a n8. States with lower endowments require larger initial
levels of contingent assets, while states with large endowments require initial negative
contingent asset positions. For example, if the worst endowment is realized so that
we1 =0 .39, the level of contingent assess for that state of 1.87 will allow a represen-
tative agent to keep a constant consumption equal to 1.41 permanently in spite of the
fact that more low wage income realizations are expected to follow.
7Permanent income diﬀerences are excluded from the model. If they were include, then all in-
equality associated to those diﬀerences will remain.
20If the best wage income of 3.14 is realized, a representative agent would like to
reduce his wealth by −3.45 to keep a constant consumption of 1.41, in exchange
for more wealth in bad states. Since the value of the capital stock, (1 + r∗)K∗, is
equal to 5.67 in the baseline calibration, the representative agent can credibly commit
to pay this amount if the best endowment is realized. In terms of Proposition (7),
the coeﬃcient
βθ
1+θ equals 0.63 which is well below the capital labor ratio of 0.79.
Thus, the capital stock in the benchmark economy is more than enough to secure all
contingent debts required to perfectly smooth consumption. According to the baseline
parametrization, the level of income risk is not enough to eat up all capital holdings
of a representative consumer.
Table 1: Required levels of Arrow securities for perfect risk sharing in
the benchmark model
(1 + r∗)k∗ =5 .67
ei 0.32 0.46 0.66 0.93 1.33 1.88 2.66
wei 0.39 0.55 0.78 1.10 1.56 2.21 3.14
θ(ei) -1.59 -1.20 -0.70 -0.09 0.68 1.66 2.93
a(ei) 1.87 1.40 0.82 0.11 -0.80 -1.96 -3.45
We conducted two alternative experiments using the benchmark. First, given the
level of persistence of endowments estimated by Heaton and Lucas, what would be
the maximum level of volatility of earnings that could still allow full insurance in the
complete market model? We ﬁnd that for σ =0 .5, K∗
f(K∗) ≈
βθ
1+θ. This implies a ratio
of almost 20 times between the best and worst possible endowment, which is more
than twice what Heaton and Lucas documented. Second, given the level of volatility
(ﬁxing σ at 0.35), what is maximum level of persistence consistent with perfect risk
sharing? We ﬁnd that for γ =0 .75, K∗
f(K∗) ≈
βθ
1+θ. This implies that shocks could still
21be substantially more persistent and still full risk sharing would be possible if markets
were completed.
According to these results, there is strong evidence from the PSID data to conclude
that if markets were complete, perfect risk sharing would be possible. Debt limits
would be irrelevant, as they would not bind, in an economy that can use its capital to
secure contingent debts. To further check the robustness of our results, we now turn
to other extremely diﬀerent calibrations of the earning process.
5 Alternative earning processes
According to the results of the previous section, debt constraints will still be bind-
ing in the complete markets model if earnings were signiﬁcantly more volatile and
persistent that what Heaton and Lucas estimated. At least two recent papers have
argued that this is in fact the case. In this section we analyze the implication of
assuming much larger persistence and volatility of earnings along the lines of these
recent papers. We argue that even under these seemingly extreme parametrizations,
our main result holds. Incomplete markets remain the main friction in explaining in-
equality and its welfare costs. We ﬁnd that if markets were complete, the dispersion
of wealth will be far too small compared with the data, and most of the tail of the
wealth distribution would disappear. Moreover, most of the potential welfare gains
of eliminating inequality could be realized by just completing the markets.
In this section we evaluate the role of debt constraints using two radically diﬀerent
parametrizations. The ﬁrst one follows the recent work of Storesletten, Telmer and
Yaron (STY, 2002). They argue that the persistence of the earning process is much
larger, at around 0.97, than what Heaton and Lucas found, at around 0.53. They
argue that the almost linearly increasing cross- sectional variance of earnings with
age requires a very large, almost unit root, degree of persistence. To formally support
22this claim, they make strong assumptions about ﬁniteness and initial conditions.
Our ﬁrst alternative parametrization is similar to our benchmark but with two
diﬀerences. First, in line with STY ﬁndings we pick γ =0 .96. Additionally, we
increase the volatility of the labor endowment by choosing σ =0 .58.I n t h i s w a y ,
our calibration of the earning process is similar to the one employed by Krueger and
Perri (2002) for an endowment economy. We can thus compare our results. Table 2
presents results analogous to Table 1 for this alternative parametrization.
Table 2: Required levels of Arrow securities for perfect risk sharing:
STY parameters
(1 + r∗)K∗ =5 .67
ei 0.14 0.24 0.43 0.77 1.37 2.46 4.39
wei 0.16 0.29 0.51 0.91 1.62 2.89 5.17
θ(ei) -16.1 -13.4 -9.2 -2.7 7.11 22.0 42.2
a(ei) 18.9 15.8 10.8 3.2 -8.3 -25.9 -49.7
It is clear from this parametrization that the modiﬁed golden rule capital stock
can only secure a fraction of the contingent debt required for full risk sharing. In
particular, a representative agent could only secure around 11% of the payments that
he/she would like to promise if the best state of nature is realized. Notice that the
ratio between the best and worst possible endowments is now 31 times.
Our second alternative parametrization is similar to the one reported by Cas-
tañeda, Días-Giménez and Ríos-Rull (CDR, 2003). Instead of looking directly at
evidence on earnings dynamics, they calibrate the earning process to match the U.S.
Lorenz curves of earnings and wealth using a model based approach8. Their model
allows for diﬀerent realistic features of the U.S. economy regarding taxation, social
8See Cordoba (2001, 2003) for a related reverse engineering exercise for the case of city size
distributions.
23security, aging and retirement. They ﬁnd the earning process to be very persistent
and extremely volatile.
To resemble their results as much as we can with our simpler model, we replicate
their parametrization. In particular, we choose β =0 .924,µ=1 .5,α=0 .376, and
δ =0 .059. In addition, we use their endowment process for the working population
as described by Table 3.
Table 3: The relative endowments of eﬃciency labor units, ei, the
stationary distribution of working-age households, p(ei),a n dt h e
transition probabilities - CDR:
ei 0.3103 0.9775 3.0349 329.2501
p(ei) 0.6227 0.2254 0.1510 0.0004
To e0
From ee 0 = e1 e0 = e2 e0 = e3 e0 = e4
e = e1 0.9843 0.0117 0.0040 0.0001
e = e2 0.0314 0.9648 0.0038 0.0000
e = e3 0.0153 0.0044 0.9800 0.0002
e = e4 0.1090 0.0050 0.0625 0.8235
The most notable feature of this earning process is the extremely high value of the
largest labor endowment. This value is required to explain the long tail in earnings
and wealth implied by the Lorenz curves. Labor endowments are also extremely
persistent. For completeness, Table 4 shows the analogous of Table 2 and 3 for this
calibration. In this case, the modiﬁed golden rule level of capital can only secure
0.34% of the required debt in the best possible state. In addition, the ratio of best to
worst possible endowments is now 1,061 (!).
24Table 4: Required levels of Arrow securities for perfect risk sharing:
CDR parameters
(1 + r∗)K∗ =5 .19
ei 0.31 0.98 3.03 329.2
wei 0.35 1.10 3.41 370.6
θ(ei) -5.9 -1 23.4 1,376
a(ei) 6.7 1.2 -26.3 -1,548
5.1 Findings
We now report some relevant predictions of four model economies. For each set
of parameters we compute two models, one with incomplete markets and one with
complete markets, as explained in Section 2. Both models preclude net borrowing.
Wealth Distributions: Table 5 reports Gini indexes and selected points of the
Lorenz curve of wealth in the U.S. and two incomplete markets models. The data
for the U.S. is taken from Castañeda, Días-Giménez et al. (2003). Overall, the CDR
parametrization better accounts for the U.S. wealth distribution in terms of Gini
coeﬃcients, and in terms of the amount of wealth owned by the wealthiest group.
The STY parametrization accounts better for the 95-99 group.
Table 5: The distribution of wealth in the U.S., and two incomplete
markets models
Gini Quintiles Top Groups
Economy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100
U.S. 0.78 -0.39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 12.62 23.95 29.55
STY 0.64 0.02 3.0 9.38 21.78 65.67 16.35 20.18 7.98
CDR 0.77 0.01 0.07 4.20 16.87 78.85 16.38 13.58 25.98
25Table 6 reports the same statistics as Table 5 but for the complete markets version
of the model economies. A signiﬁcant amount of wealth inequality still remains due to
the large amount of labor income risk relative to the capital holdings. Gini indexes fall
but not substantially. The concentration of wealth in the top percentile is, however,
signiﬁcantly reduced in both models. These results reveal one of the main limitations
of debt-constrained models in explaining the U.S. wealth distribution. They cannot
account for the large concentration of wealth in the wealthiest group, even if they can
produce particularly high Gini coeﬃcients.
Table 6: The distribution of wealth in the U.S., and in two complete
markets models
Gini Quintiles Top Groups
Economy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100
U.S. 0.78 -0.39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 12.62 23.95 29.55
STY 0.60 0.06 2.85 10.89 24.60 61.02 16.03 17.01 6.06
CDR 0.65 0.81 3.67 6.52 18.53 70.47 18.53 18.47 6.68
The distribution of consumption: Table 7 reports Gini indexes and selected
points of the Lorenz curve of consumption in the U.S. and two incomplete markets
models. The data for the U.S. is taken from Castañeda, et al. (2003). It is important
to highlight that data on consumption is less reliable than data on wealth (see At-
tanasio et al. 2004 for a recent discussion). In terms of consumption, the STY model
performs extremely well and does a better job than the CDR model in all respects.
The CDR model produces too much concentration of consumption in the top tail.
We conclude that while the CDR parametrization provides a better explanation for
the U.S. wealth inequality, the STY parametrization provides a better explanation
for the U.S. consumption inequality.
26Table 7: The distribution of consumption in the U.S., and two
incomplete markets models
Gini Quintiles Top Groups
Economy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100
U.S. 0.30 7.19 12.96 17.80 23.77 38.28 9.43 9.69 3.77
STY 0.32 6.98 12.43 19.92 24.44 39.24 10.04 9.96 3.23
CDR 0.52 5.41 5.51 10.98 18.18 59.93 14.97 11.99 11.59
Table 8 reports the same statistics as Table 7 but for the complete markets versions
of the model economies. As with the distribution of wealth, Gini coeﬃcients do not
change substantially. In terms of Lorenz curves and Gini coeﬃcients, the STY model
is still very successful in accounting for the U.S. evidence. In terms of the distribution
of consumption, complete market models perform extremely well but not better than
incomplete markets models.
Table 8: The distribution of consumption in the U.S. and two complete
markets models
The Distribution of Consumption
Gini Quintiles Top Groups
Economy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100
U.S. 0.30 7.19 12.96 17.80 23.77 38.28 9.43 9.69 3.77
STY 0.26 9.51 13.32 18.67 22.78 35.72 8.45 9.37 2.51
CDR 0.38 7.19 9.52 13.46 24.80 45.03 10.49 8.40 6.28
Other statistics: Tables 9 and 10 show other relevant predictions of the incom-
plete and complete-markets debt-constrained models. The ﬁrst two columns assess
the amount of precautionary savings implied by the models. The excess of savings
relative to a frictionless economy, measured by δk
y − δk∗
y∗ , is between 4.46% and 11.6%
27in the incomplete markets economies considered. This is a dramatic increase relative
to what Aiyagari (1994) estimated using Heaton and Lucas (1996) computations. The
amount of precautionary savings in the complete markets models is signiﬁcantly lower
but still larger than previously found.
Columns three and four in the tables report the coeﬃcient of variation of wealth
and income. According to Rodríguez et al (2002, Table 1), the coeﬃcient of variation
of wealth is 6.53. The only model that comes close to account for this large variation
is the CRD model with incomplete markets. Other models fall substantially short in
producing signiﬁcant wealth variation. The complete markets models considered can
at most explain 24% of the observed variability while the incomplete markets models
can explain up to 92%.





y∗ Coef.Var[k] Coef.Var[c] Welfare Gains (θ)
STY 86.6% 11.6% 2.63 0.60 53%
CDR 49.5% 4.46% 6.01 2.16 79%
Finally we compute a standard equalitarian measure of welfare costs of inequality.







U [(1 + θ)c(x,e)]dJ∗(x,e).
The left hand side of this formula is the welfare of a representative agent in a
frictionless economy. The right hand side of the economy is a measure of social
welfare in one of the distorted economies where all agents have the same weight, and
all consumptions are increased proportionally by the rate θ. θ thus measures the social
gains from eliminating all inequality in terms of permanent proportional consumption
increases. Table 9 shows that the potential welfare gains are quite large, between
53% and 79%. These are quite sizable gains compared, say, with the welfare gains of
28eliminating business cycles (Lucas, 1988). Most importantly for our purposes, Table
10 shows that most gains could be realized by completing the markets. In particular,
if market were complete, the remaining potential welfare gains would be between
14.6% and 35%.





y∗ Coef.Var[k] Coef.Var[c] Welfare Gains (θ)
STY 30.6% 4.41% 1.22 0.48 14.6%
CDR 19.8% 1.87% 1.53 2.16 35%
6 Concluding comments
Kehoe and Levine (2001) favors the use of debt-constrained models over incomplete-
markets debt-constrained models because they are simpler and produce similar results.
For example, in both models, the interest rate is below the rate of time preference
and capital is overaccumulated. Kehoe and Zame (2002) argue that market incom-
pleteness does not matter if agents are suﬃciently patient and there is no aggregate
uncertainty. Krueger and Perri (2002) argue that debt-constrained models better ex-
plain the evidence of U.S. inequality during the last 30 years. In contrast with this
literature, we show that market incompleteness matters substantially, more so than
debt constraints, to explain the large concentration of wealth in the U.S., and its large
dispersion. We also show that the welfare costs of incomplete markets are substantial
for two arguably realistic calibrations of the earning process.
Our debt constraints are exogenous and simple. Net borrowing is precluded.
Other debt-constrained models derive endogenous debt limits that prevent default
in pure exchange economies when traders can be excluded from spot markets. The
threat of exclusion provides a role for unsecured debt. We do not analyze the role of
unsecured debt in our model because it can only strengthen our main point at the cost
29of unnecessary complications. If unsecured debt were allowed on the top of secured
debt, debt constraints alone would be able to explain even less of the observed wealth
and consumption inequality. This is because more relaxed debt limits will further
expand the risk-sharing opportunities and prevent larger dispersion of consumptions
and wealth.
O n ec o u l da r g u et h a ti fc a p i t a lc a n n o tb eu s e da sc o l l a t e r a lf o rd e b t st h e nd e b t -
constrained models could still be able to account for the main features of the data.
We do not think this is the case. In the paper, we studied earning processes that
were extremely risky so that the amount of collateral in the economy plays only a
minor role. We ﬁnd that in those cases debt constrained-models can produce neither
signiﬁcant wealth dispersion nor wealth concentration in the top tail. Moreover, we
think that the most realistic assumption is to allow capital to serve as collateral since
most debts in U.S. are secured9.
9For example, Canner et. al. (1995, Figure 1) ﬁnd that more than 75% of the household debt in
the U.S. is mortage debt, which can be considered secured debt. A large fraction of the remaining
part is also secured because it includes loans for automobiles, mobile homes, trailers, etc.
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